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Secondary Trauma by Cklara Moradian

Secondary Trauma

by Cklara Moradian

Cklara Moradian, MSW

Cklara Moradian, MSW

Secondary Trauma

Kurdish babies born in refugee camps are given names like Sangar (barricade), Awara (displaced), Revin (escape), Zindan (prisoner), Ranjbar (someone who suffers), Firmesk (tears), Bezar (spiteful), Xabat (fight), Tola (revenge), Hawar (wailing) Rizgar (rescued), Snoor (border), Lana (home).

They are victims of geography, survivors of a map.

They grow to sow their lips in protest and they carve symbols into their skin, coordinates of their birthplace as if to say “when you find me, send me home.”

Mothers spend hours lulling their restless children to sleep, singing lullabies that tell of a journey filled with rage. They do not migrate through the process of abscission. They are plucked in violence, deported.

What pains are passed on in these names? What wisdom?

It’s called secondary trauma, as if the seconds it takes to cut the umbilical cord from my mother could insulate me from the torture inflicted on her bones by the state, by displacement, by despair.

As if the lines that separate me from you is drawn in red, or in yellow tape, marking a departure clear enough for me to really feel where you end and I begin. Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

I didn’t have to be there to see my uncles hanged for speaking their mother tongue to taste the bitter end of my roots flicker as I try to speak my language, the fluency of which escapes me now.
I didn’t have to be there to know of what you went through during forced confessions, Father. I didn’t have to hear the wailing of my imprisoned kin to now be startled awake by their cries.

Visions of my ancestors forced from the mountains into the desert with blistering feet keep me awake. I walk barefoot on tiptoes as if my feet are blistered. Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

What is secondary about this intergenerational heirloom, passed down to me without my consent? What massacres happened in this crossing from one continent to the other? What comes first? Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

They say I have not differentiated myself enough (not in my identity formation). The subtleties of my individuality have become murky in the passage of loss from one generation to the other.

I close my eyelids to find refuge but my memory is fact. It is in my DNA, in epigenetic shapeshifting. The past is present.
What is secondary about waking every day to the news of another genocide, another friend dead, another aunt, sister enslaved? Another exodus? What is secondary about ritual mourning? Every morning! When can we heal? When can we fully grieve when it is never-ending? Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

I once read that pain flows from one family member to the next until someone is ready to feel it. I feel it. I feel it in my flesh, in the marrow of my bones, in my gut. It is like pins right under my fingernails, accumulating in somatic bruises on my thighs. And it shows when I reach out to you and say “I bear witness.” Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

At night, I twist and turn into the fetal position, my belly sounding off my people’s history. I carry it in my posture, the way I am weight down by sorrows I have no names for. I hold it in my voice when it vibrates with fear. I am anchored to the agony of exile. It is all-consuming. It is water. It is in the heaviness of the air that does not fully fill my lungs. It is in the space where I sit with all that has been done to you, in all the places where your jawlines were broken by armed men in uniform Father, beaten to shatters until you could not eat for days.

I remember so you can go on forgetting because you need to forget. I remember so you can go on forgetting.

Every time I look in the mirror, the outline of your silhouette is reflecting back your pain. Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

What is secondary about this pain? To me, it has been an offering. It has been a profound loss, wrapped in every conversation, gifted to me in passing. That “all things are lost” is imparted in disorganized attachment, in denial, melancholia, in the sense of betrayal, in bedtime stories of persecution.

My mother, pregnant and imprisoned at 18, was beaten black and blue until she miscarried. I grew up knowing I was not her first child. Grief has come in abundance. Safety was scarce. Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

Where is the line between lived experience and being raised with the knowledge of all that has been lost? Tell me, what is loss?

In the journey of displacement, I have lost language, I have lost language (s). I have lost birth certificates, passports, a state. I have lost the promise of return to a land forever stolen from me. I have lost count of my losses. Tell me, where do you end and I begin?

The coordinates of my birthplace is Latitude 36°14′ 47″N Longitude 46° 15′ 59″ E. I am another refugee child with a mispronounced name. When I die, send me home!



Cklara Moradian, MSW

Cklara Moradian, MSW

Cklara Moradian, MSW; is a diaspora Kurd, a former refugee from Eastern Kurdistan/Iran, and a spoken word poet. Her work is deeply steeped in her life experiences as a survivor.
She uses poetry and creative non-fiction as a response to the current and past atrocities/genocide her community has endured. Her work attempts to bear witness, tell stories of love and survivorship in the face of hardship and pain
Cklara is also a published spoken word poet who has performed at national and international human rights conferences, such as Amnesty International’s annual gathering, UNWomen events, university campuses, such as Cal State LA, Cal State Northridge, Cal State Fullerton, CalArts, and UCLA, as well as at national and international political rallies and literary events.
Cklara is a Social Worker, who is helping to implement the youth-centered strength-based interventions in clinical and policy/research arenas. Cklara’s work is rooted in anti-oppressive liberatory theory and practice. She hopes to continue to serve multiply-marginalized communities, center disenfranchised voices, and elevate the strengths and resiliency of people who have and continue to deal with personal and intergenerational trauma. Her journey of healing from mental and physical illness informs her work with diaspora communities. Prior to Social Work, for over ten years, Cklara was involved in social justice advocacy.

Iran: Reveal whereabouts of four Kurdish men

amnesty-internationalReveal whereabouts of four Kurdish men 

UA: 171/17 Index: MDE 13/6734/2017 Iran        Date: 13 July 2017 

Four men from Iran’s Kurdish minority have been subjected to enforced disappearance since their arrests on 23 and 24 June. The authorities have refused to provide any information to their families about their fate or whereabouts. The men, who are all related, are at risk of extrajudicial execution, torture, and other human rights violations.

Ramin Hosseinpanahi

Ramin Hossein Panahi, a member of the Komala armed opposition group, was arrested on 23 June after taking part in armed clashes with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the city of Sanandaj, Kurdistan province, northwest Iran. Amnesty International understands that Ramin Hossein Panahi was injured during the clashes. His family has not been informed of his fate or whereabouts but they learned through a local non-official source that, following his arrest, he was initially taken to a hospital for about an hour and then moved to an undisclosed location.

His family is concerned that he will be denied critical medical care for his injuries.

The Iranian authorities often deny prisoners access to adequate medical care, sometimes as an intentional act of cruelty intended to intimidate and punish them, or to extract forced “confessions”.  

Hours after Ramin Hossein Panahi’s arrest, the Revolutionary Guards stormed his parents’ house in the village of Qeruchay, near Sanandaj, and arrested his brother, Afshin Hossein Panahi

They raided the house again on 24 June and arrested three other members of his family: Ahmad Hossein Panahi (brother-in-law); Zobeyr Hossein Panahi(distant relative); and Anvar Hossein Panahi (cousin), who has since been released. Information received by Amnesty International suggests that none of these men had any involvement in the armed clashes.

Since their arrest, the authorities have refused to provide any information to their families about the fate or whereabouts of the three men still detained.

On 10 July, the mother of Ramin Hossein Panahi visited the Ministry of Intelligence office in Sanandaj, where officials said that the Revolutionary Guards were responsible for his case and therefore his arrest and that the Ministry of Intelligence had nothing to do with him. However, the Revolutionary Guards had previously told the family that they had transferred him to the detention of the Ministry of Intelligence so he was no longer their responsibility. The four men still in detention are victims of enforced disappearance, which is a crime under international law, and are at risk of torture and other ill-treatment.

Please write immediately in English, Persian or your own language calling on the Iranian authorities to: 

– Immediately reveal the fate and whereabouts of Ramin Hossein Panahi, Afshin Hossein Panahi, Ahmad Hossein Panahi, and Zobeyr Hossein Panahi;
– Release Afshin Hossein Panahi, Ahmad Hossein Panahi, and Zobeyr Hossein Panahi if they have been detained solely because of their family connection with Ramin Hossein Panahi;
–  Ensure that all four men are provided with any medical care they may require and are protected from torture and other ill-treatment;
– Ensure that Ramin Hossein Panahi is provided with immediate access to medical care and to an independent lawyer of his choosing and promptly brought before a judge.


Justice Department of Kurdistan Province 
Imam Shafe’i Square
Shahid Shebli Boulevard
PO Box: 6614786964
Kurdistan Province

Head of the Judiciary 
Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani
c/o Public Relations Office
Number 4, Deadend of 1 Azizi
Above Pasteur Intersection
Vali Asr Street
Tehran, Iran

And copies to

Advisor to the President for Ethnic and Religious Minorities’ Affairs 

Ali Younesi
Office of the Presidency
Pasteur Street, Pasteur Square
Tehran, Iran

Also, send copies to diplomatic representatives accredited to your country.

Please insert local diplomatic addresses below: 


Address 1

Address 2

Address 3

Fax: Fax number

Email: Email address

Salutation: Salutation

Please check with your section office if sending appeals after the above date.


Additional Information

The men’s families have reported making strenuous efforts to locate them by visiting various government offices in Sanandaj and Qorveh, and the village of Dehgolan, all in Kurdistan province, but said that officials refused to disclose their fate or whereabouts. Instead, officials have directed threats and insults at them, describing their loved ones as “terrorists”.

Amnesty International understands that the arrests of Ramin Hossein Panahi, Afshin Hossein Panahi, Anvar Hossein Panahi, Ahmad Hossein Panahi, and Zobeyr Hossein Panahi were carried out in a violent manner. According to accounts from Ramin Hossein Panahi’s family, armed Revolutionary Guards wearing black masks broke down the front door of their family house on 24 June and beat the men, as well as Ramin Hossein Panahi’s sister and elderly father. They also warned them against holding gatherings or giving media interviews.

In addition to Ramin Hossein Panahi, three other men affiliated with the armed Kurdish opposition group Komala were involved in the exchange of gunfire on 23 June 2017. They included Sabah Hossein Panahi, Hamed Seyf Panahi and Behzad Nouri. Ramin Hossein Panahi was injured and subsequently arrested while the latter three were shot dead. The exchange of gunfire apparently started at a Revolutionary Guards checkpoint after the men were identified while traveling in a car and did not heed a call to stop. The authorities have refused to return the dead bodies of the three men to their families for burials and warned the families against holding memorial gatherings. Komala has claimed that six members of the Revolutionary Guards were also killed during the clashes but the Revolutionary Guards did not acknowledge any casualties in the official statement they issued on 23 June. Komala is an armed Kurdish opposition group which has been engaged in armed activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1980s.

Kurds are one of Iran’s disadvantaged ethnic minorities and face entrenched discrimination that curtails their access to employment, adequate housing and the exercise of their cultural, economic, civil and political rights. Continued economic neglect of provinces populated by Kurds, which include Kurdistan, Kermanshah and parts of West Azerbaijan, have further entrenched poverty and marginalization. Politically, Iran’s Kurdish minority have criticized the centralization of political life in Iran and the absence of any measures to introduce any form of minority self-government.

International law absolutely prohibits enforced disappearances and specifies that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as justification. Enforced disappearances are particularly cruel human rights violations. Individuals are cut off from the outside world, left knowing that their loved ones have no idea where they are or whether they are dead or alive. They are placed outside of the protection of the law and denied their right to legal representation or a fair trial. Treaty bodies, human rights courts and other human rights bodies have repeatedly found that enforced disappearances also violate the right to liberty and security of the person, the right not to be subjected to torture or other ill-treatment, the right to remedy, and the right to life. An enforced disappearance is also a “continuing crime”, which takes place so long as the disappeared person remains missing and information about his or her fate or whereabouts has not been provided by the state. Enforced disappearances also have a profound effect on the family members and friends of the disappeared individuals who are sometimes forced to anxiously wait years before they find out if their loved one is alive or dead.

Name: Ramin Hossein Panahi, Afshin Hossein Panahi, Ahmad Hossein Panahi, Zobeyr Hossein Panahi
Gender m/f: All male

UA: 171/17 Index: MDE 13/6734/2017 Issue Date: 13 July 2017

The Urgent Action is available on the Amnesty International website at the following link:

Dr. Azad Moradian : Establishing a Kurdish State Will Shake the Balance in the Region

Featured Image -- 2317The Kurdistan Voice: As you know, one of the most disputed political topics in the Middle East is the independence referendum of Kurdistan, which will be held within the next three months. Until now, Iran has opposed the referendum more than Baghdad or even Ankara. Is Iran afraid of an independent Kurdistan because it is likely to become a catalyst for the Kurds of Iran?

Dr. Moradian: An independent Kurdish state, regardless of size, is a direct threat to Iranian political hegemony and the regional power of the Middle East.

Essentially, the long-term strategic goal of Iran is to create a Shiite block, or as they call it, a Shiite Crescent and claim the territorial and ideological leadership of the Shiite world.

The removal of Saddam Hussein created the space for the Iranian regime to further spread their influence in the region.

In Lebanon and in part of Yemen, Iran has already been able to establish their dominance and have widespread Shiite support. All of Iranian’s efforts in Syria are towards this same end.

While Iran has been involved in Syria since the beginning of the conflict, they became physically engaged in 2014 to preserve the power of an Alawite Shiite regime. The territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria and the preservation of the ruling powers in these countries is of paramount importance to Iran. Therefore, anything that threatens this plan is something Iran will vehemently oppose. Kurds are situated, physically and politically, in direct opposition to this plan. Kurds are also positioned to oppose Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambitions to reestablish an Ottoman Sunni Crescent (please see Question 3 for more on this topic).

Establishing a Kurdish state will shake the balance in the region, as it does not reinforce the larger geopolitical visions of Iran and/or Turkey.
Furthermore, while the situations of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are different, there is cross-border influence and exchange. The formation of a Kurdish state in any one of these regions can catalyze Kurds in other regions.

Iranian Kurds established the first Kurdish state (The Republic of Mahabad 1946), so the history is there for people to be moved into action by what happens in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is a great deal of movement between Kurds in Iraq and Iran; therefore, we cannot minimize the power of the independence referendum in revitalizing resistance in other regions of Kurdistan.

Anytime we discuss Middle East politics, we must touch on the economic impact of regional changes. Iran, in part because of their position in OPEC, has a key economic role. An independent Kurdistan with their rich oil reserves will become a dominant voice regarding what happens to oil exports. Iran does not want to share this power. While Iran is afraid of a future state of Kurdistan threatening internal affair, the issue is more complex than that. Iran opposes the referendum because a Kurdish state threats Iranian political, economic, and ideological dominance in all aspects.

On the ideological front, Iran does not want to have a secular democratic state at its borders. Despite all of the internal party issues in Iraqi Kurdistan, the system can still be an antidote to Iranian theocracy. This would create tension within Iran, not just in the Kurdish region of Iran, as it can inspire the Iranian democracy seeking movement.

For example, the stance that Iraqi Kurdistan has towards women, religious tolerance, political pluralism and open media can all have an impact on Iran’s civic engagement.

The Kurdish region, in the past 20 years, has shown a much more progressive stance towards human rights issues. Travel and intellectual exchange between the two countries could threaten the Iranian regime’s ability to maintain a dictatorship and subdue resistance and activism. Religious tolerance and women’s issues are especially key.

The Kurdistan Voice: The former U.S. president, George Bush had an unsuccessful Great Middle-East plan for the democratization of the region. Is it possible that the Trumps’ administration pursues a similar plan to strengthen the U.S. power and reduce Russia’s influence in the region?

Dr. Moradian: Let me begin by distinguishing between Bush’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and that of Trump.

The two are actually different, at least in terms of messaging. Both Sr. Bush and Jr. Bush had the slogan of destroying dictatorship and establishing democracy in the region as their stated reasons for getting involved in the Middle East.

This was the case in the early 90’s with Bush Sr. and was also the case with Bush Jr. Trump says: “America First” and states that he is there for reestablishing America’s dominance, politically, economically and ideologically. Establishing democracy does not appear to be part of the plan.

On the surface, we might think that Bush’s vision of destroying dictatorship and establishing western style democracy is a worthy cause. The reality is not exactly as noble. First of all, establishing democracy was never clearly defined or classified. There was also no clear plan of how this was going to happen. For example, Bush failed to help foster a clear alternative that would fill the void left behind after the toppling of dictatorship. Furthermore, power was not properly divvied up between all the stakeholders on the ground.

The project was left completely unfinished. In part, as a result of this, the region has been plagued by the horrors of ISIS. The human, economic, and cultural costs have been enormous.

Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. succeeded in toppling dictators but then the region was abandoned to deal with the cascading consequences of war and instability. Whether Trump’s foreign policy is going to work better remains to be seen. Time will tell. So far there is no clear vision in mind.

The Bush administration, as well as Obama’s, were committed to the one Iraq, one Syria policy and were not interested in supporting the Kurdish quest for self-determination. They saw the continuation of Iraq as well as Syria (as an intact country) as a priority. At the same time, they did not have a plan of how to support the type of political system that would lead to democracy. Territorial integrity was chosen over the well-being of people. The cost has been great suffering and further instability. This policy has had a devastating impact on Kurds and has been one of the biggest blows to Kurdish interests.

While America has relied on Kurds to neutralize extremism and give tactical and military support to American troops, it has in turn, refused to support Kurds in their political ambitions.

We don’t yet know if the Trump administration is going to continue this policy or move in a different direction. The Trump administration has supported Kurds in Syria militarily but there is so far no indication that things will be different politically.

When it comes to Russia, the issue is even more complex. While Russia appears to want to reestablish its former Soviet supremacy in the world, it is entangled in more pressing concerns closer its own borders, such as in Ukraine and Georgia.

Russia is a strong player militarily but economically it is on the same level as a country like Italy. It, therefore, does not have the leverage to continue taking a strong stance in the Middle East. The most it can hope for is to recreate the balance of power between east and west that the old Soviet once had.

Trump’s policy towards Russia has been to sit down with Russia and negotiate while making sure Russia does not have a leadership role in the world. In this regard, Trump’s policy is a conservative American stance and not a new one but it is a deviation from Obama.

Trump administration is interested in U.S. global dominance and not in power sharing. By helping Russia economically, it is likely that Russia will want to trade its influence in Syria and Iran for more dominance in the Eastern block and for more financial opportunities.


The Kurdistan Voice: It seems Turkey faces a dilemma between the United States and Russia concern to its regional policy and has been the failure to gain its strategic goals, especially in Syria as the United States has sent military equipment to the Kurdish forces of the People’s Protect Union without getting attention to the Ankara’s threats.

How is the Turkey’s policy in the region explainable?

Dr. Moradian: Before the year 2003 when AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power, Turkey’s main goals in the region were twofold:

One, it wanted to self-preserve through a strong nationalism. Its policies were geared towards fostering a secular nationalistic state. It did not expend energy and resources on expansionist policies.

Two, it wanted to become a strong economic force. It did so by being a key NATO member. It was able to do just that as it had the largest border with the East. Turkey was seen as the bridge between the East and West. It was able to gain tremendously on the economic front. For 44 years, Turkey benefited financially from the Truman Doctrine, of aid to countries that were moving away from Communism towards Democracy.

In an effort to control Communism, Turkey profited financially and politically.

The Turkish military was the guardian of this secular nationalistic state. Kurds, or anyone else, that threatened this vision were brutally repressed and slaughtered. The war against Kurds helped strengthen the Turkish state by giving the army a constant enemy. Turkey was the beneficiary of the Cold War but needed a new direction after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Understanding the recent history of Turkish foreign policy requires understanding Ahmet Davutoğlu doctrine and philosophy. He is the theoretical founder of the direction Turkey took after the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2002-2009 he had an advisory role and from 2009-2014 he was the foreign minister of Turkey and then became Prime Minister from 2014-2016.

Ahmet Davutoğlu’s philosophy was to move Turkey towards a regional power by emphasizing pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism. The direction of its foreign policy moved towards an expansionist one. An Islamist Pan-Turkish vision replaced secular nationalism.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan introduced laws that challenged secularism. He also started to bring forward Islamist ideology in its internal and foreign policy. It began meddling in regional affairs. For example, it became embroidered in a conflict with Israel in support of Hamas. It took positions on Afghanistan and then even more so in Syria. It supported Chechens against Russia.

Initially, Ahmet Davutoğlu attempted to minimize conflict with its neighbors by becoming closer to Iran, Greece, Armenia, Iraq, and Syria. He believed that he could have more influence in the region by neutralizing tensions. This was positive for Turkey. During the time Iran was internationally sanctioned, Turkey was able to go around these sanctions and benefit economically.

Ahmet Davutoğlu was also interested in a peace process with the PKK in order to;

1) Bring Turkey closer to joining the European Union,

2) Minimize tensions internally

3) Reduce the role of the army, which was traditionally the guardian of secular nationalism and not pan-Islamist.

Ultimately, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision was a failed one. The peace process with the PKK did not move forward in part because the army and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan itself had no interest in following through.

Furthermore, by the early 2012’s it was clear that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saw himself as an Islamic leader. It drew further and further away from Europe. Joining the European Union was no longer at the forefront of Turkish national interests. The first confrontations with the west came when the U.S first invaded Iraq. Turkey initially resisted the war by not allowing the U.S military to use its bases. Furthermore, in the conflict between Gaza and Israel, it took the side of Gaza. Ahmet Davutoğl’s philosophy was clashing with the West.

Ahmet Davutoğl then supported Muslim Brotherhood and in this way wanted to penetrate in the Arab region’s internal affairs. Turkey took up a leading role in the Arab Spring. It had a proactive foreign policy at the time. It would actively pursue opportunities to expand its power.

Turkey wanted to position itself as a model for the Middle East: an Islamic country that was (at least on the surface) democratic. However, Arab Spring was too large of a conflict for Turkey to be able to control.

With the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey’s role also diminished. It was not able to hold on to any power in Libya or Egypt. It became further entangled in the conflict in Syria.

The Syrian uprising and civil war were another places that Turkey attempted to have great influence. In fact, Turkey’s role in the creation and expansion of ISIS is documented but needs further scrutiny. Turkey appears to have used ISIS, as well as the refugee crisis, as a way to further hurt the Kurds and expand its powers in the region. However, with the defeat of ISIS, Turkey’s role has been further questioned. Despite the evidence, the West has yet to directly hold Turkey responsible for aiding ISIS; however, the West no longer sees Turkey as a model for the region.

By 2016, as a result of Ahmet Davutoğl’s failures to establish the type of regional dominance it set out to do, he was forced out of the political arena.

Turkey today is forced into a reactive strategy, rather than proactive position. It is at odds with its neighbors and internally unstable and more polarized than ever.




Dr. Azad Moradian, a Kurdish- American Politician was born in Iranian Kurdistan (Eastern Kurdistan). Dr. Moradian specializes in Kurdish and Iranian politics. His articles are regularly published in several media outlets and magazines. He gives regular political comments on radio and TV broadcasts. He also analyzed Kurdish politics and internal fratricide between political factions, and its dire consequences.

Dr. Moradian is Chair of Kurdish American Committee for Democracy and Human right in Iran, and co-founder of Voice of Kurdish-American Radio for Democracy, Peace, and Freedom.

Dr. Moradian is a former member of the board of directors of Kurdish National Congress of North America.





Himan Uraminejad has been warned by prison officials that he is at risk of execution as Iran’s Head of Judiciary has approved the implementation of his death sentence. He has been on death row since 2012 for a crime committed when he was 17 years old.

Himan Uraminejad has been warned by prison officials that he is at risk of execution as Iran’s Head of Judiciary has approved the implementation of his death sentence. He has been on death row since 2012 for a crime committed when he was 17 years old.

Amnesty International has learnt on 21 November that Himan Uraminejad, aged 22, was informed by prison officials on 6 October that the Head of Judiciary had approved the implementation of his death sentence and his family should intensify their efforts to seek a pardon from the family of the deceased because his execution could be carried out at any moment. He was sentenced to death in August 2012 after a criminal court in Kurdistan Province convicted him of murder over the fatal stabbing of a boy during a group fight. He was 17 years old at the time of the crime. In September 2014, the Supreme Court quashed his death sentence and granted him a retrial, based on new juvenile sentencing provisions in Iran’s 2013 Islamic Penal Code. In June 2015, however, he was sentenced to death again. The criminal court presiding over his retrial referred to an official medical opinion that found “no evidence of a disorder at the time of the crime that would remove criminal liability”. The court also referred to Himan Uraminejad’s statements that he had no “mental illness or history of hospitalization” and understood killing someone was “religiously forbidden” (haram). The Supreme Court upheld the death sentence in November 2015 and rejected a subsequent request for retrial.


Himan Uraminejad was sentenced after a grossly unfair trial that relied on evidence obtained through torture. He was arrested on 22 April 2012 when he was 17 years old. He was subsequently transferred to an undisclosed detention centre where he was held for 20 days, without access to his family and lawyer. He has said that during this period, he was tortured, including by repeated beatings that left scars and bruises all over his face and body, and suspension from the ceiling by a rope tied to his feet. He has said that police also raped him with an object shaped like an egg, threatened to cut off his testicles and walked over his body with boots. Himan Uraminejad’s trial was held before an adult court, without special juvenile justice protections. The court ordered no investigation into his allegations of torture.

Please write immediately in English, Persian, Arabic, French and Spanish or your own language:

  • Urging the Iranian authorities to halt any plans to execute Himan Uraminejad, and commute his death sentence without delay;
  • Urging them to ensure that his conviction is quashed and that he is granted a fair retrial in accordance with the principles of juvenile justice, in particular ensuring that no statements obtained through torture and other ill- treatment are admitted as evidence;
  • Urging them to ensure his allegations of torture are investigated and those responsible are brought to justice;
  • Immediately establish an official moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death

Please send your appeals to the care of Iranian embassies in your country, listed below. If there is no Iranian embassy in your country, please mail the letter to the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, 622 Third Avenue, 34th Floor, New York, NY 10017, United States. Please insert local diplomatic addresses below:

Name Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Fax Fax number Email Email address Salutation Salutation

Please check with your section office if sending appeals after the above date. This is the first update of UA 72/16. Further information:



 The minimum age of criminal responsibility in Iran is set at nine lunar years for girls and 15 lunar years for boys. From this age, a child who is convicted of murder or crimes that fall in the category of hodud (offences that carry inalterable punishments prescribed by Shari’a law) is generally convicted and sentenced in the same way as an adult. However, since the adoption of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, judges have been given discretion not to sentence juvenile offenders to death if they determine that juvenile offenders did not understand the nature of the crime or its consequences, or their “mental maturity” is in doubt.

The criteria for assessing “mental growth and maturity” are unclear and arbitrary. As illustrated by the case of Himan Uraminejad, judges often conflate the issue of lesser culpability of juveniles because of their lack of maturity with the diminished responsibility of people with mental illness, concluding that the juvenile offender was not “afflicted with insanity” or was “in a healthy mental state”, and therefore deserved the death penalty. Sometimes, judges focus exclusively on whether the juvenile could tell that it is wrong to kill a human being, and disregard interdisciplinary social science studies on the relationship between adolescence and crime, including neuroscientific findings on brain maturity, which have informed juvenile justice principles considering juveniles less culpable than adults due to their developmental immaturity and cognitive limitations (see Growing up on death row: The death penalty and juvenile offenders in Iran,

As a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Iran is legally obliged to treat everyone under the age of 18 as a child. This is different from the minimum age of criminal responsibility, which is the age below which children are deemed not to have the capacity to break the law. This age varies between countries, but it must be no lower than 12 years, according to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. People who have broken the law who are above the minimum age of criminal responsibility, but under 18, may be considered criminally responsible, prosecuted, tried and punished. However, they should never be subjected to the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of release.

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reviewed Iran’s implementation of the CRC in January 2016. The Committee’s Concluding Observations expressed “serious concern” that the exemption of juvenile offenders from the death penalty is “under full discretion of judges who are allowed, but not mandated to seek forensic expert opinion and that several persons have been resentenced to death following such retrials”. Beside Himan Uraminejad, Amnesty International is aware of several other cases, including Salar Shadizadi, Hamid Ahmadi and Sajad Sanjari, who have been retried, found to have sufficient “mental maturity” at the time of the crime and sentenced to death again. Amnesty International is also aware of at least 15 juvenile offenders who have been sentenced to death for the first time since the adoption of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code.

Amnesty International has recorded at least 75 executions of juvenile offenders between 2005 and 2016, including two in 2016. One of them was Hassan Afshar, who was hanged in July. Iran’s lack of transparency on its use of the death penalty means that the total number of executions of juvenile offenders could be much higher. According to a UN report issued in 2014, at least 160 juvenile offenders are now on death row. Amnesty International has been able to identify the names of 78 of these juvenile offenders. Some of them have been on death row for over a decade and are either unaware of their right to seek a retrial based on the new provisions of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code or do not have the means to retain a lawyer to seek it for them.

The Head of the Judiciary must provide a type of approval known as estizan in all cases where the death penalty has been imposed under the Islamic principle of “retribution-in-kind” (qesas) before the sentence can be implemented.

Name: Himan Uraminejad Gender m/f: m

Further information on

دارى ئازادى كوردستان ديسان به خوينى پيشمه رگه قاره مانه كانى ديموكرات ئاودرا



دارى ئازادى كوردستان ديسان به خوينى پيشمه رگه قاره مانه كانى ديموكرات ئاو درا

دارى ئازادى كوردستان ديسان به خوينى گه نجان و لاوانى ئازا و شورشگيرى كورد ئاو درا
.به خوينى ئازايه تى ، خو راگرى وگيان به خت كردنى ٦ پيشمه رگه ى ره چه شكينى زستانى سه خله تى روژهه لاتى كوردستان
له ميژه له روژ هه لات شه وه، سه رما و سه هولبه ندانى بي ئينتهاى شاريكى خه وتوو
سه رما بردوو و كز كردوو له ژير كورسى بى ده سه لاتى و نا هوميدى دا
له ميژه ئاسو روى له م وه لاته نكردووه، و شه فه ق له خوينى گه شى ئاخرين شه هيدى بى ناوى ئه م نيشتمانه دا سه رماى به ردووه
،هه وره تريشقه ى ئه م شه وه خه وتووه كز بى هانا كه ته نانه ت به رچاوى بى سوماى گه نجيكى تينوى كورديش روون ناكاته وه له ميژه له هه ورى تال و تاريكى سه ر شه قام و كولانى ئه م ولاته دا روى نه داوه . نه باس له دلوپىكى بارانه له وشك سالى مه زراى ئه م سه رزوينه دا، وه نه پشكوى ئاگريك كه ئاسنى ميشكى دواكوتوى ناهوميدى بتاوينى ته وه
من شينگيرى بو ٦ پيشمه رگه ى حيزبى خوشه ويستى ديموكراتى كوردستانى ئيران ناكم. ئه و ٦ قاره مانه ى كه بو خويان به ئاشكرا و روون ده يانزانى  كه دارى ئازادى كوردستان به خوينى پيشمه رگه كان ئاو ده دريت. ئه و ٦ هاورى كه ده يزانى شه وى سارد و سه رما بردوى كوردستان هاناى ده ست و چه كى ئه وانى ده ويت.  ٦ ئاگر، ٦ هه وره تريشقه، ٦ لافاو و سيلاو، ٦ شورش و خه بات بوون، ئه و ٦ پيشمه رگه  كه به باورى من هه زاران كه س بوون، ئه وان پيشمه رگه بوون ، ره چه شكينى خه باتى نوى كوردستان
قه سه م به خوينى ئه و شه هيدانه كه ئاگرى ئه مجارى كوردستان قه لاى دوژمن ده سوتينيت و ئازادى بو گه لى كورد ، ئازادى بو گه لى چه وساوه ى روژهه لاتى كوردستان به خه لات دينيت
سه رخوشى له بنه ماله ى ٦ شه هيدى قاره مانى كورد ده كم، سه رخوشى له هاوريانيان له حيزبى ديموكراتى كوردستانى ئيران و له هه مو گه لى كورد له هه رچوار پارچه ى خه فه ت بار و لى قه وماوى كورد
بى گومان خوينى پاكى ئه و شه هيدانهده بيته هويه كى راستقينه بو يه كگرتنه وه ى هه مو ئه ندامانى بنه ماله ى حيزبى ديموكرات كوردستان و نزيك بوونه وى هه مو ريكخراوه سياسى ونيزاميه كانى  كورد له روژ هه لاتى كوردستان دا
 پيك هاتنى به ره يه كى  يه كگرتوى كورد ، به ئه زمون وگه وره  بو به ربه ره كانه  و خه بات  بو شه ريكى راستقينه دژ به كومارى سى داره له ئيران دائاواتى هه مو شه هيدانى كوردو بنه ماله ى دل سوتاوى ئه وانه.

د. ئازاد موراديان

به رپرسى كوميته ى كورده كانى نيشته جى ئه مريكا بو ديموكراسى و مافى مروڤ له ئيران

، ١٧ى مانگى ٦ى سالى ٢٠١٦ ى زايينى – لوس ئه نجيليس، كاليفورنيا

گفتگوی راديو پيام کانادا با آقايان آزاد ‏مراديان‬ و محمد ‏آسنگران‬

گفتگوی راديو پيام کانادا با آقايان آزاد مراديان‬ و محمد آسنگران‬ پيرامون جنگ دولت‫ ‏ترکيه‬ با مردم کردستان: حکومت نظامی و محاصره شهرهای کردستان ترکیه و‫‏سرکوب‬ مردم بوسیله ارتش و نیروهای نظامی دولت اردوغان‬

دكتر آزاد مراديان در مصاحبه با راديو پيام؛ جنگ تمام عيار دولت تركيه در كوردستان تركيه تنها جنگ عليه مردم حق طلب كورد نيست، اين جنگ مبارزه اى بى امان در ميان مدافعان دموكراسى ، حق طلبى،  آزاديخواهى  و برابرى خواهان در برابر ديكتاتورى، ارتجاع، تروريستهاى دولتى  وسياستهاى توسعه طلبانه دولت اسلامگرا و سنت گرا و فاشيستى اردوغان و حزب حاكم آك پ است

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Enver Huseyin Penahî Nameyek Bo Ban KÎ Mon Şand

Enver Huseyin Penahî Nameyek Bo Ban KÎ Mon Şand

În 10/04/2009

anvar-hosein-panahi.jpgEnwer Husênpenahî, girtiyê siyasî yê Kurd, roja 09.04.2009’an, nameyek ji bo Ban Kî Mon, Sekreterê Giştî yê Rêxistina Neteweyên Yekbûyî şand.

Navhatî bi biryara îdamê hatiye mehkûmkirin û di nameya xwe de daxwazê ji Ban Kî Mon dike ku alîkariya wî bike

Enwer Husênpenahî di nameya xwe de qala çawaniya

binçavkirina xwe ji aliyê hêzên rejîma Îslamî a Îranê ve li bajarê Qurwe dike û basa vê yekê dike ku di hepsa takekesî de rastî azar û îşkenceyên hovane hatiye. Wî her wiha tometa hevkarîkirin tevî partiyên Kurdistanî yên neyarê rejîma Îslamî a Îranê red dike û nivîsiye ku serbarê xurttirîn îşkenceyan, tometên han qebûl nekiriye û berdewam hewla îsbatkirina bêtawaniya xwe daye.

Enwer Husênpenahî di beşek din a nameya xwe de dinivîse ku di girtîgeha bajarê Qurwe de daxwaza rohnbûna çarenivîs û derkirina biryara azadiya xwe kiriye, lê berpirsên Dozgeriya têkildar tu girîngiyek bi daxwaziya wî nedane û bi wê sedemê navhatî dest daye gireva birçîbûnê. Navhatî ku mafê mifahwergirtin ji parêzer nebûye, di Taya yek a Dadgeha Şoreş a bajarê Sine de bi cezayê îdamê hatiye mehkûmkirin. Enwer Husênpenahî di doma nameya xwe de bi mirina gumanbar a birayê xwe Eşref Husênpenahî îşare dike ku take kesek bû bi dû rewşa birayê xwe diçû. Navhatî her wiha basa vê yekê dike ku bona nîşandana nerazîbûnê li dijî newekhevî û rewşa xirab a sîstema dadweiryê di Îranê de, di girtîgeha navendî a Sine de dest dabû gireveke 45 rojî a xwarinê.

Ew di dawiya nameya xwe de pêbendnebûna rejîma Komara Îslamî a Îranê bi yasayên navneteweyî ku îmza kirine û daxuyaniya Cîhanî a Mafê Mirovan a Rêxistina Neteweyên Yekbûyî, tîne berbas. Her wiha navhatî daxwazê ji Rêxistina Neteweyên Yekbûyî û Sekreterê Giştî yê wê dike ku bi wî re alîkariyê bikin, ji ber ku alîkarîkirina wê rêxistinê dibe sedema zêdebûna girîngî û prestîja wê rêxistinê

Mass Public Strikes in Iranian Kurdistan

Mass Public Strikes in Iranian Kurdistan

July 14, 2009, Paris – A one day strike was staged in almost all the Iranian Kurdish cities in the provinces of West Azerbijan, Kordestan, Kirmashan and Ilam in July 13, 2009. The majority of the shops in these cities were closed and Kurdistan went into darkness for three minutes.
Shaho Hussieni, the foreign relations chief of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI) said: “This one day strike was planned to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Dr. Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou and his aides’ assassination and to condemn the terrorist activities of the clerical regime of Iran. PDKI had called upon the people of Kurdistan to go on strike on July 13 a month ago and had asked them to engage in some civil disobediences.”

The regime’s security forces had beefed up security and presence to prevent such a strike. Husseini also points out that “since our call for a Kurdistan-wide strike on July 13, regime’s security apparatus have been intimidating and pressuring the people of Kurdistan to not participate in this strike and avoid performing any activities.” He also adds that “Such pressures were much noticeable yesterday when the regime’s forces assaulted shop owners for closing their shops and broke many locks on stores that did not open on Monday and forced some shop owners to stay in their shops. It is likely that these pressures will continue in the days to come as well.”

The turnout in Iranian Kurdistan for regime’s staged presidential election on June 12 was very low in comparison to other parts of Iran. The PDKI foreign chief adds “Many people in Iranian Kurdistan did not turn out to vote in this election claiming that the election was staged and protested the fact that regime’s elections will not bring about any reforms in the clerical regime and the destiny of the Iranian people and the people of Kurdistan in particular will remain unchanged within this regime. This civil disobedience of the people of Kurdistan can be interpreted as an act of protest against the regime’s policies and existence.”

20 years ago, on 13 July 1989, a legendary Kurdish leader and then the Secretary-general of PDKI, Dr. Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou and two of his associates were killed by the diplomat-terrorists of the clerical regime in an apartment in the outskirts of the Austrian capital Vienna where they were holding secret talks with envoys sent by then regime’s president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
In spite of credible evidence on the direct involvement of dispatched diplomat-terrorists of the Islamic regime in this tragedy, then the government of Austria sacrificed justice for her country’s political and commercial interests and allowed the three suspected accomplices who had taken refuge in the Iranian embassy after the 1989 killings to slip out of Austria without ever being questioned by the Austrian authorities.

Recently, new convincing evidences have surfaced on the Iranian regime’s involvement, above all Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current regime’s president in the 1989 execution-style attack obtained from the testimony given to the Italian police by a jailed German arms dealer, who said he had supplied Ahmadinejad with weapons in Vienna shortly before Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou’s assassination.
Agence-France-Presse reported that “the German, who made his statement to Italian anti-Mafia officers in 2006, said he was in contact with Iranian intelligence services in 1989 regarding arms deals. Shortly before the killing, he said he delivered in the first week of July 1989 half a dozen light weapons at a meeting at the Iranian embassy in Vienna.”

Furthermore, the Associated Press reported that “Peter Pilz, a top official with Austria’s Green Party and its spokesman on security said he wants a warrant issued for Ahmadinejad’s arrest, alleging the president-elect “stands under strong suspicion of having been involved” in the killings of Kurdish politician Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou and two associates by providing weapons to the Iranian commandos who carried out the slaying.”

Austrian Times also reported that “Pilz claimed there had been two Iranian teams involved in the assassinations – a negotiations team and an execution team. Pilz said Ahmadinejad had been responsible for gathering and preparing the weapons used and had been a member of the execution team.”
Nonetheless, the Austrian officials deem these convincing evidences insufficient to kick-off any investigations fearing retaliation from the Iranian government and severing business ties with the regime of Tehran.

Kurdish Journalist M. Adnan Hassanpour, and Kurdish Activist Hiwa Butimar Sentenced to Death In Iran

Press Release

Kurdish Journalist M. Adnan Hassanpour, and Kurdish Activist Hiwa Butimar Sentenced to Death In Iran
On July 17, 2007 two Kurdish journalists and social activists were sentenced to death for their work in Kurdish human rights and the Kurdish media. The trial had been accompanied by unconfirmed suggestions in the Iranian media that the two men – journalist Adnan Hassanpour and social activist Hiwa Butimar – were working with “banned Iranian-Kurdish groups” that oppose the Islamic government. Mr. Hassanpour’s lawyer, Dr. Saleh Nikbakhat, who was not allowed in the Islamic Revolutionary Court, told the media that he would appeal their death sentences.
Mr. Hassanpour was arrested January 25, 2007 in front of his home in his hometown of Marivan, in the province of Kurdistan of Iran. He was taken to a detention facility run by the Ministry of Intelligence in the provincial capital, Sannandaj, where he has had been held incommunicado – putting him at risk of torture or ill treatment. Since he was taken to Sannandaj in February he has not been allowed access to a defending lawyer or to his family.
Mr. Adnan Hassanpour is a former member of the editorial board of the Kurdish-Persian weekly journal Aso, which the Iranian authorities closed down in August 2005. The journal had been suspended on the orders of the Culture and Islamic Orientation Ministry, because it carried articles about the very tense situation in Iranian Kurdistan.
The Islamic Regime of Iran continues to imprison the greatest number of journalists and human rights activists in the world. The situation of journalists in the Kurdish part of Iran worsens daily.
We believe that the death sentence against Mr. Hassanpour and Mr. Boutimar is in contravention of the human rights convention and is a violation of basic rights. We strongly condemn their detention and trial at the hands of Iranian authorities. We urgently ask all human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists around the world to force the Islamic Republic of Iran to stop the execution, torture, and imprisonment of Kurdish and non-Kurdish human rights defenders and journalists in Iran.
Azad Moradian
Chair of Kurdish American Committee for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran

Los Angeles, USA

818.434.9692 Date published: Saturday, July 21, 2007

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