دوا وێستگهی ژیانی تێرۆریستێك و ڕهنگدانهوهكانی له ئاستی تێرۆری نێودهوڵهتی
ئاماده كردن و لێكۆڵینهوه : ئهمین خهواله
ههر وهك ئاگادارین سهر له بهیانی رۆژی ههینی ڕابردوو ڕێكهوتی ١٣ی بهفرانبار فهرماندهی تێرۆریستی سۆپای قۆدس سهر به هێزهكانی ڕژیمی كۆماری ئیسلامی هاوڕێ له گهڵ ئهبوو مههدی مۆههندیس جێگری سهرۆكی هێزهكانی حهشدی شهعبی كه له لایهن ئێران و به مهبهستی ئاژاوهگێڕی له وڵاتی عێراق و ههرێمی كوردستانی باشوور له ماوهی چهن ساڵی ڕابردوو له لایهن ڕژیمی كۆماری ئیسلامی پێك هات، له هێرشێكی فڕۆكه بێ فڕۆكهوانهكانی ئامریكا دوای گهیشتنی ناوبراو بۆ شاری بهغدا و له نزیك فڕۆكهخانهی نێودهوڵهتی ئهوشاره كهوتنه بهر هێرشی توندی ئهو هێزه و له دهرئهنجامدا كوژران و نابوود كران و كۆتایی به دهسهڵاتی ناوبراو له ناوچهكه هێنرا.
بهڵام هاوكات دهسهڵاتدارانی ڕژیمی كۆماری ئیسلامی به گهوره نیشاندانی ناوبراو و درووستكردنی قارهمانێكی نێونهتهوهیی له ناوبراو ئهیانهوێت ناوبراو وهكوو سهمبۆلێك گهوره بكهنهوه و داوای خوێنخوازی ناوبراو بكهن و لایهنه شاراوهكانی ناوبراو بشارنهوه و هاوكات ناڕهزایهتییه جهماوهرییهكانی ماوهیهكی پێش ئێستای نهتهوهكانی ئێران دابمركێنن و بیخهنه لانهی له بیركردنهوه. قاسم سولهیمانی له دایك بووی ساڵی ١٣٣٥ی ههتاوی له گوندێكی سهر به پارێزگای كرمان ههڵكهوتوو له باشووری ڕۆژههڵاتی وڵاتی ئێران له دایك بووه. ناوبراو ساڵهكانی شهڕ له نێوان ههر دوو وڵاتانی ئێران و عیراق وهكوو فهرمانده هێز بهشداری كردووه و دواتر وهكوو فهرمانده هیزی لهشكهری ٤١ی كرمان دیاریكراوه تا ئهو جێگایهی وهكوو فهرمانده لیوا بهرزترین پلهی هێزی سهربازی ئهو وڵاتهی پێ بهخشراوه و دواتر له لایهن ڕێبهری ئایینی ئیران، عهلی خامنهیی وهكوو فهرماندهی گشتی هێزهكانی سۆپای قۆدس له دهرهوهی وڵات و ناوچهكه و پهرهپێدانی تێرۆریستی نێودهوڵهتی له ناوچهكهدا دیاری كراوه.
قاسم سهرهكی ههر له سهرهتای هاتنه سهركار و دهسهڵاتی وهكوو خۆدهرخستن و نیشاندانی تواناكانی خۆی دهورێكی كاریگهری ههبووه له تێرۆری ڕێبهرانی شههیدی گهلی كورد دوكتۆر عهبدولرهحمان قاسملوو سكرتێری گشتی حیزبی دێموكراتی كوردستانی ئێران ساڵی ١٣٦٨ی ههتاوی له ڤییهن و دواتر تێرۆری ڕێبهری بلیمهتی گهلی كورد و هاوكات سكرتێری گشتیی حیزبی دێموكراتی كوردستانی ئێران دوكتۆر سادق شهرهفكهندی له ساڵی ١٣٧١ی ههتاوی دا و هاوكات دامهزراندنی دهیان گرووپی تێرۆریستی له وڵاتانی لۆبنان، سووریه، ئهفغانستان، فهلهستین، عێراق و به گشتی ناوچهی ڕۆژههڵاتی ناوهڕاست و پهرهپێدان به تێرۆری نێودهوڵهتی و ههناردهكردنی تێرۆریستی نێودهوڵهتی بۆ وڵاتانی ڕۆژئاوایی و تهنانهت ئامریكاش بۆ وێنه دهستێوهردان و بهشداری له پڕۆسهی تهقینهوهكانی ساڵی ٢٠٠٧ له نیۆیۆرك له وڵاتی ئامریكا.
پشتیوانی ڕاستهوخۆی ڕیبهری ئایینی ڕژیمی ئێران و هاوئاههنگی له گهڵ ناوبراو بۆ ههر ڕێژه پارهیهك له بهردهستی ناوبراو بۆ وهدیهێنان و دامهزراندنی هیلالێكی شێعه له ناوچهكه و ههنارده كردنی تێرۆریستی نێودهوڵهتی به ههر نهرخێك یهكێك بووه له ئامانجه سهركییهكانی ڕژیمی كۆنهپهرهستی كۆماری ئیسلامی ئێران و له ههڵگرتنی ئهم ههنگاوهش دا زۆر جار لایهنه تێرۆریستهكانی وڵاتانی دراوسێ و ناوچهكهش هاوكاری و پشتیوانیی ناوبراویان كردووه و ههر چهشنه یارمهتییهكی ناوبراویان داوه ههر چهن ڕژیمی ئێران داهاتی نهوت و ژێرخانی ئابووری وڵاتهكهی به خنكاندنی جهماوهر و نهتهوهكهی و میللهتهكهی دابین كردووه بۆ پهرهپێدانی تێرۆریستی نیودهوڵهتی و بهدیهێنانی خهون و ئاواتهكانی له ناوچهكه و بگره له وڵاتانی ڕؤژئاواییش و ههتا ئامریكا و زۆر جێگای دیكهش.
دوای چهندین ساڵ خهونی سهربهخۆیی پڕۆسهی ڕێفراندۆمی ههرێمی كوردستانی باشوور بهرهو قۆناغێكی نوێ ههنگاوی ههڵگرتبوو بهڵام به داخهوه جارێكی دیكه و له ههنگاوێكی قێزهونێكی دیكهدا قاسم سولهیمانی و دار و دهستهكهی به یارمهتیی چهن هێزێكی ناوخۆیی خائین به نیشتمان ڕێگر بوون لو وهدیهێنانی خهونی له مێژینهی كوردستان و به ئاژاوهگێڕی و ئهستاندنهوهی پارچهیهكی گهوره له خاكی نیشتمان، كهركووكی دڵی كوردستان دهستیان گرت به سهر ههموو داهاتهكانی ڕێفڕاندۆم و له ڕاستییدا دهرئهنجامی ڕێفرانۆمیان زهوت كرد و ڕێگایان نهدا ئهو ههله سهر بگرێت و ئهو پارچهی كوردستان ئازاد و سهربهخۆ بێت، له بهر ئهوهی مهترسییهكی گهوره بۆ بهشێكی گهورهی ژێر دهسهڵاتی ئێران كه ساڵانێكی زۆره به ناڕهوا دهست گیراوه به سهر خاكی ئهو بهشه له ڕؤژههڵاتی كوردستان و ههروهها پهرهئهستاندنی ڕێفراندۆم بۆ پارچهكانی دیكه وهكوو باكووری و ڕۆژئاوا و دواتریش وهكوو بینرا له ههوڵی كوردانی ڕؤژئاوای كوردستان بۆ گهیشتن به سهربهخۆیی جارێكی دیكه گهوره تێرۆریستی پاسداری ڕژیمی كۆماری ئیسلامی گهیشته فریای بهشار ئهسهدی سهرۆك رژیمی بهعس له وڵاتی سووریه و تهمهن ئهو ڕژیمه دیكتاتۆرهی بۆ ساڵانێكی دیكه نوێ كردهوه و دهستی گرت به سهر ئهرك و ماندووبوونهكانی كوردی ئهو پارچهیهش و ئهو هێزانهشی له ناخدا خنكاند و بڵیسهی ئاگری سهربهخۆیی لهو بهشهی نیشتمان كوژاندهوه.
ناوبراو ساڵانێكی زۆر به پشتیوانی و لایهنگری و پهروهردهكردنی هێزهكانی حێزبۆڵا له وڵاتی لۆبنان پێگهیهكی گهورهی بۆ خۆی و وڵاتهكهی درووست كردووه بۆ دهستێوهردان له كاروباری ئهو وڵاته و نزیكایهتی به وڵاتی فهلهستین و دزه كردن بۆ ناو هێزهكانی وڵاتی ئیسرائیل به ههموو هێز و تواناكانییهوه و ساڵانه به ناردنی چهك و چۆڵ و پارهیهكی زۆر ههموو ههوڵێكێان وهگڕ خستووه بۆ پهرهپێدانی ئهم هێزه تێرۆریستییه له ناوچهكهدا. له گهڵ هاتنه سهر دهسهڵاتی هێزهكانی داعیش له وڵاتی عێراق و سووریه قاسم سۆلهیمانی تێرۆریست به دامهزراندنی چهن گرووپی شێعه له وڵاتانی عێراق و سووریه و له سهرووی ههمووی ئهوانهوه دامهزراندنی هێزێكی شێعه له ژێر فهرمانی خۆی دا به ناوی حهشدی شهعبی تا ڕادهیهكی زۆر توانی هێز و تواناكانی خۆی بهینێته ئهو وڵاته تا ئهو جێگای ئهو هێزه وهكوو یهكهم هێزی هاوشێوه سهربازی له وڵاتی عێراق گهوره بكاتهوه و له ماوهیهكی كورتدا ئهم ناوی ئهم هێزه بخاته سهر زمانی ههمووان و پێگه و جێگایهكی بهرچاو بۆ ئهو هێزه دهستكرده له پاڕلهمانی ئهو وڵاته بكاتهوه و بهو هۆیهوه جموجووڵهكانی له ناوچهكه چهندین بهرانبهر پهره پێ بدات و تهنانهت دهسهڵاتدارانی ئهو وڵاتانه به تهواوهتی بخاته ژێر ڕكێف خۆی و وڵاتهكهی.
له ئێستاش دا دوای كوشتنی له لایهن هێزه ئاسمانییهكانی ئامریكا و پووچهڵكردنهوهی ههموو پیلان و پڕۆگرامهكانی خۆی و وڵاتهكهی له ناوچهكهدا، دهسهڵاتدارانی ڕژیمی ئێران و له سهرووی ههموویانهوه ڕێبهری ئایینی ڕژیمی كۆماری ئیسلامی به قارهمانی نهتهوهیی ناوبردن و شوبهاندنی ناوبراو ههموو ههوڵێكی خۆیان وهگر خستووه ناوبراو وهكوو پاڵهوانێكی بێ بنهما و دهستكرد نیشانی جهماوهر و نهتهوهكانی بندهستی خۆیان بدهن و به تهمای ئهوهن ناو و یادی ناوبراو ههتا ههتایی بكهن بهڵام مخابن جهماوهر و كۆمهڵگای بندهسهڵاتییان زۆر لهوه چاوكراوتر و هۆشیارتر بوون و ئهوهیان له بیر ناچێت كه قاسم سولهیمانی تێرۆریست قاتڵ و بكوژی ڕۆڵهكانییانه و ههر ماوهیهك بهر له ئێستا به فهرمانی ناوبراو و هاوڕێیانی زیاتر له ١٥٠٠ كهس جهماوهری بێ تاوان كوژران و تا ئێستاش زیاتر له چهند ههزار كهس له بهندیخانهكانی كۆماری سێداره بێ تاوان بهند كراون و چارهنووسیان ناڕوون و نادیاره و له كۆتایی دا ههر ههوڵێك بۆ قهرهبوو كردنهوهی كوشتنی ناوبراو ئهبێته هۆی ڕووخانی یهگجارهكی ڕژیمی كۆماری ئیسلامی و ئهوانیش خۆیان به باشی ئاگادارن و چاك ئهزانن.
World Bank: Iran Likely to Suffer Worse Recession Than Previously Thought
June 05, 2019 7:40 PM
By: Michael Lipin
WASHINGTON —The World Bank says Iran is likely to experience an even worse recession this year than previously thought, as U.S. sanctions largely choke off oil exports that have been Tehran’s main revenue source.
In its latest Global Economic Prospects report published Wednesday, the Washington-based institution that provides loans to countries said it expects Iran’s Gross Domestic Product to shrink by 4.5% this year, a steeper contraction than its earlier estimate of negative 3.6% GDP growth for 2019.
“The oil industry is an important part of Iran’s economy, and its oil production is clearly going to drop because of the new U.S. sanctions,” said Patrick Clawson, research director for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in a VOA Persian interview on Wednesday.
The Trump administration imposed a total, unilateral ban on Iranian oil exports on May 2 as part of its campaign of “maximum pressure” on Iran to negotiate an end to its perceived malign behaviors. It had issued sanctions waivers to eight of Iran’s oil customers in November to allow them to keep importing Iranian crude for six months, but later said it would not renew those waivers and would require those customers to reduce such imports to zero.
U.S. economist Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore told VOA Persian in another Wednesday interview that Iran’s internal economic problems also are to blame for its worsening recession. “Iran is very corrupt, has very little economic freedom, and it’s hard to start a business there because Iran is not really a free market or liberal economy,” Hanke said.
Transparency International, a Berlin-based civil society organization that monitors global corruption, has ranked Iran 138 out of 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index.
Iran’s other low global economic rankings include 155 out of 180 nations in the Economic Freedom Index of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, a conservative public policy institute, and 128 out of 190 governments in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index.
The World Bank’s new report also said Iran’s year-on-year inflation rate has risen sharply from about 10% in the middle of last year to about 52% in April. It said the depreciation of Iran’s rial since May 2018, when the U.S. announced it would re-impose sanctions on Iran, has contributed to the rising inflation. The rial’s slump versus the dollar in Iran’s unofficial currency market has made dollar-denominated imports more expensive for Iranians.
Clawson said Iran’s inflation is high primarily because it is relying on printing money to finance its spending. “The Iranian government is not bringing in enough revenue to pay for its expenses, so it is borrowing money from the banking system to cover the difference, and that is driving inflation,” he said.
Hanke, who says he is the only economist outside Iran to measure its inflation with high frequency, told VOA Persian that he calculated Iran’s actual inflation rate to be 113% on Wednesday, much higher than the World Bank’s latest reading.
The World Bank’s projection of a 4.5% contraction in Iran’s GDP this year is not as bad as the 6% contraction predicted by the International Monetary Fund, another global lending agency, in its latest report from April. The World Bank also said it expects economic growth in Iran to return next year “as the impact of U.S. sanctions tapers off and as inflation stabilizes.” It projected a 0.9% rise in Iran’s GDP for 2020.
Hanke declined to make his own predictions for Iran’s economic performance, saying any forecasts for a nation such as Iran are problematic because they rely on guesswork.
This article originated in VOA’s Persian Service.
A Joint Letter to Mr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on Imminent Execution of Ramin Hossein Panahi, a Kurdish Political Prisoner in Iran
A Joint Letter to Mr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on Imminent Execution of Ramin Hossein Panahi, a Kurdish Political Prisoner in Iran
H.E. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein
United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights
52, rue de Paquis 10
1211 Geneva Switzerland
Re: The Imminent Execution of Ramin Hossein Panahi, a Kurdish Political Prisoner in Iran
Yet another Kurdish human rights activist, Ramin Hossein Panahi is in imminent danger of execution in Iran. According to Hossein Ahmadiniaz, Mr. Panahi’s lawyer the supreme court of Iran has upheld the death sentence rather than advising the proper legal functions and procedures to be followed. Although no documented charges have been brought against Mr. Panahi, he has been kept in solitary confinement and incommunicado, leading to his ongoing hunger strike against the unbearable prison conditions. Mr. Panahi’s father, who had recently been able to speak to his son briefly on the phone, is apprehensive and wants the whole world to know about the imminent danger that his son faces. The terrified parents of Mr. Panahi have announced a sit-in front of the prison and have threatened that if their son is executed, they will also put an end to their own lives. The plight of this family is typical of many Kurdish and other Iranian families whose members are in prison, many of whom are on death row.
The current explosion in imprisonments and criminalization of any form of dissent following recent public protests is not unprecedented; Kurds as an ethnic and religious minority are under double surveillance, scrutiny, cultural policing, militarism, economic deprivation and political oppression. Anyone, particularly with an ethnic or religious minority background with the slightest discontent and dissent, is in danger of imprisonment and unfair trials. Mr. Panahai is a political prisoner of conscience whose demand for basic human rights is being met with greater injustice and gallows in flagrant violations of human rights in a system that stifles any dissent with mass arrests and death penalty, the details of which are well documented in your latest report on the situation of human rights in Iran, issued by the late Ms. Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on Iran.
Mr. Panahi’s lawyer has appealed for a judicial review to override the death penalty decision against his client who has been falsely charged with armed insurrection against the Islamic Republic, a capital offense that is punishable by death. Because of the horror of solitary imprisonment, Mr. Panahi has been on hunger strike since January 27 to protest the prison condition and his conviction both of which are in violation of all international laws and Islamic Republic’s membership in such entities.
If human rights organizations and the international community stand aside and do not protest, the politics of fear and death will persist with its frenzied ritual of mass arrests and executions of political prisoners. We welcome the latest report and insistent call for the improvement of human rights in Iran and hereby urge you to take immediate action to halt the execution of Mr. Ramin Hossein Panahi. He urgently needs proper medical treatment and family visits as the solitary detention has put him in a more precarious condition. We appeal to you to exert pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure Mr. Panahi’s immediate and unconditional release from prison.
| Dr. Azad Moradian
Chair of Kurdish American Committee for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran (KACDHI)
Dr. Amir Sharifi
Director of Kurdish Human Rights Advocacy Group-Los Angeles
The Kurdistan Voice: As you know, one of the most disputed political topics in the Middle East is the independence referendum of Kurdistan, which will be held within the next three months. Until now, Iran has opposed the referendum more than Baghdad or even Ankara. Is Iran afraid of an independent Kurdistan because it is likely to become a catalyst for the Kurds of Iran?
Dr. Moradian: An independent Kurdish state, regardless of size, is a direct threat to Iranian political hegemony and the regional power of the Middle East.
Essentially, the long-term strategic goal of Iran is to create a Shiite block, or as they call it, a Shiite Crescent and claim the territorial and ideological leadership of the Shiite world.
The removal of Saddam Hussein created the space for the Iranian regime to further spread their influence in the region.
In Lebanon and in part of Yemen, Iran has already been able to establish their dominance and have widespread Shiite support. All of Iranian’s efforts in Syria are towards this same end.
While Iran has been involved in Syria since the beginning of the conflict, they became physically engaged in 2014 to preserve the power of an Alawite Shiite regime. The territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria and the preservation of the ruling powers in these countries is of paramount importance to Iran. Therefore, anything that threatens this plan is something Iran will vehemently oppose. Kurds are situated, physically and politically, in direct opposition to this plan. Kurds are also positioned to oppose Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambitions to reestablish an Ottoman Sunni Crescent (please see Question 3 for more on this topic).
Establishing a Kurdish state will shake the balance in the region, as it does not reinforce the larger geopolitical visions of Iran and/or Turkey.
Furthermore, while the situations of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are different, there is cross-border influence and exchange. The formation of a Kurdish state in any one of these regions can catalyze Kurds in other regions.
Iranian Kurds established the first Kurdish state (The Republic of Mahabad 1946), so the history is there for people to be moved into action by what happens in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is a great deal of movement between Kurds in Iraq and Iran; therefore, we cannot minimize the power of the independence referendum in revitalizing resistance in other regions of Kurdistan.
Anytime we discuss Middle East politics, we must touch on the economic impact of regional changes. Iran, in part because of their position in OPEC, has a key economic role. An independent Kurdistan with their rich oil reserves will become a dominant voice regarding what happens to oil exports. Iran does not want to share this power. While Iran is afraid of a future state of Kurdistan threatening internal affair, the issue is more complex than that. Iran opposes the referendum because a Kurdish state threats Iranian political, economic, and ideological dominance in all aspects.
On the ideological front, Iran does not want to have a secular democratic state at its borders. Despite all of the internal party issues in Iraqi Kurdistan, the system can still be an antidote to Iranian theocracy. This would create tension within Iran, not just in the Kurdish region of Iran, as it can inspire the Iranian democracy seeking movement.
For example, the stance that Iraqi Kurdistan has towards women, religious tolerance, political pluralism and open media can all have an impact on Iran’s civic engagement.
The Kurdish region, in the past 20 years, has shown a much more progressive stance towards human rights issues. Travel and intellectual exchange between the two countries could threaten the Iranian regime’s ability to maintain a dictatorship and subdue resistance and activism. Religious tolerance and women’s issues are especially key.
The Kurdistan Voice: The former U.S. president, George Bush had an unsuccessful Great Middle-East plan for the democratization of the region. Is it possible that the Trumps’ administration pursues a similar plan to strengthen the U.S. power and reduce Russia’s influence in the region?
Dr. Moradian: Let me begin by distinguishing between Bush’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and that of Trump.
The two are actually different, at least in terms of messaging. Both Sr. Bush and Jr. Bush had the slogan of destroying dictatorship and establishing democracy in the region as their stated reasons for getting involved in the Middle East.
This was the case in the early 90’s with Bush Sr. and was also the case with Bush Jr. Trump says: “America First” and states that he is there for reestablishing America’s dominance, politically, economically and ideologically. Establishing democracy does not appear to be part of the plan.
On the surface, we might think that Bush’s vision of destroying dictatorship and establishing western style democracy is a worthy cause. The reality is not exactly as noble. First of all, establishing democracy was never clearly defined or classified. There was also no clear plan of how this was going to happen. For example, Bush failed to help foster a clear alternative that would fill the void left behind after the toppling of dictatorship. Furthermore, power was not properly divvied up between all the stakeholders on the ground.
The project was left completely unfinished. In part, as a result of this, the region has been plagued by the horrors of ISIS. The human, economic, and cultural costs have been enormous.
Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. succeeded in toppling dictators but then the region was abandoned to deal with the cascading consequences of war and instability. Whether Trump’s foreign policy is going to work better remains to be seen. Time will tell. So far there is no clear vision in mind.
The Bush administration, as well as Obama’s, were committed to the one Iraq, one Syria policy and were not interested in supporting the Kurdish quest for self-determination. They saw the continuation of Iraq as well as Syria (as an intact country) as a priority. At the same time, they did not have a plan of how to support the type of political system that would lead to democracy. Territorial integrity was chosen over the well-being of people. The cost has been great suffering and further instability. This policy has had a devastating impact on Kurds and has been one of the biggest blows to Kurdish interests.
While America has relied on Kurds to neutralize extremism and give tactical and military support to American troops, it has in turn, refused to support Kurds in their political ambitions.
We don’t yet know if the Trump administration is going to continue this policy or move in a different direction. The Trump administration has supported Kurds in Syria militarily but there is so far no indication that things will be different politically.
When it comes to Russia, the issue is even more complex. While Russia appears to want to reestablish its former Soviet supremacy in the world, it is entangled in more pressing concerns closer its own borders, such as in Ukraine and Georgia.
Russia is a strong player militarily but economically it is on the same level as a country like Italy. It, therefore, does not have the leverage to continue taking a strong stance in the Middle East. The most it can hope for is to recreate the balance of power between east and west that the old Soviet once had.
Trump’s policy towards Russia has been to sit down with Russia and negotiate while making sure Russia does not have a leadership role in the world. In this regard, Trump’s policy is a conservative American stance and not a new one but it is a deviation from Obama.
Trump administration is interested in U.S. global dominance and not in power sharing. By helping Russia economically, it is likely that Russia will want to trade its influence in Syria and Iran for more dominance in the Eastern block and for more financial opportunities.
The Kurdistan Voice: It seems Turkey faces a dilemma between the United States and Russia concern to its regional policy and has been the failure to gain its strategic goals, especially in Syria as the United States has sent military equipment to the Kurdish forces of the People’s Protect Union without getting attention to the Ankara’s threats.
How is the Turkey’s policy in the region explainable?
Dr. Moradian: Before the year 2003 when AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power, Turkey’s main goals in the region were twofold:
One, it wanted to self-preserve through a strong nationalism. Its policies were geared towards fostering a secular nationalistic state. It did not expend energy and resources on expansionist policies.
Two, it wanted to become a strong economic force. It did so by being a key NATO member. It was able to do just that as it had the largest border with the East. Turkey was seen as the bridge between the East and West. It was able to gain tremendously on the economic front. For 44 years, Turkey benefited financially from the Truman Doctrine, of aid to countries that were moving away from Communism towards Democracy.
In an effort to control Communism, Turkey profited financially and politically.
The Turkish military was the guardian of this secular nationalistic state. Kurds, or anyone else, that threatened this vision were brutally repressed and slaughtered. The war against Kurds helped strengthen the Turkish state by giving the army a constant enemy. Turkey was the beneficiary of the Cold War but needed a new direction after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Understanding the recent history of Turkish foreign policy requires understanding Ahmet Davutoğlu doctrine and philosophy. He is the theoretical founder of the direction Turkey took after the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2002-2009 he had an advisory role and from 2009-2014 he was the foreign minister of Turkey and then became Prime Minister from 2014-2016.
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s philosophy was to move Turkey towards a regional power by emphasizing pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism. The direction of its foreign policy moved towards an expansionist one. An Islamist Pan-Turkish vision replaced secular nationalism.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan introduced laws that challenged secularism. He also started to bring forward Islamist ideology in its internal and foreign policy. It began meddling in regional affairs. For example, it became embroidered in a conflict with Israel in support of Hamas. It took positions on Afghanistan and then even more so in Syria. It supported Chechens against Russia.
Initially, Ahmet Davutoğlu attempted to minimize conflict with its neighbors by becoming closer to Iran, Greece, Armenia, Iraq, and Syria. He believed that he could have more influence in the region by neutralizing tensions. This was positive for Turkey. During the time Iran was internationally sanctioned, Turkey was able to go around these sanctions and benefit economically.
Ahmet Davutoğlu was also interested in a peace process with the PKK in order to;
1) Bring Turkey closer to joining the European Union,
2) Minimize tensions internally
3) Reduce the role of the army, which was traditionally the guardian of secular nationalism and not pan-Islamist.
Ultimately, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision was a failed one. The peace process with the PKK did not move forward in part because the army and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan itself had no interest in following through.
Furthermore, by the early 2012’s it was clear that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saw himself as an Islamic leader. It drew further and further away from Europe. Joining the European Union was no longer at the forefront of Turkish national interests. The first confrontations with the west came when the U.S first invaded Iraq. Turkey initially resisted the war by not allowing the U.S military to use its bases. Furthermore, in the conflict between Gaza and Israel, it took the side of Gaza. Ahmet Davutoğl’s philosophy was clashing with the West.
Ahmet Davutoğl then supported Muslim Brotherhood and in this way wanted to penetrate in the Arab region’s internal affairs. Turkey took up a leading role in the Arab Spring. It had a proactive foreign policy at the time. It would actively pursue opportunities to expand its power.
Turkey wanted to position itself as a model for the Middle East: an Islamic country that was (at least on the surface) democratic. However, Arab Spring was too large of a conflict for Turkey to be able to control.
With the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey’s role also diminished. It was not able to hold on to any power in Libya or Egypt. It became further entangled in the conflict in Syria.
The Syrian uprising and civil war were another places that Turkey attempted to have great influence. In fact, Turkey’s role in the creation and expansion of ISIS is documented but needs further scrutiny. Turkey appears to have used ISIS, as well as the refugee crisis, as a way to further hurt the Kurds and expand its powers in the region. However, with the defeat of ISIS, Turkey’s role has been further questioned. Despite the evidence, the West has yet to directly hold Turkey responsible for aiding ISIS; however, the West no longer sees Turkey as a model for the region.
By 2016, as a result of Ahmet Davutoğl’s failures to establish the type of regional dominance it set out to do, he was forced out of the political arena.
Turkey today is forced into a reactive strategy, rather than proactive position. It is at odds with its neighbors and internally unstable and more polarized than ever.
Dr. Azad Moradian, a Kurdish- American Politician was born in Iranian Kurdistan (Eastern Kurdistan). Dr. Moradian specializes in Kurdish and Iranian politics. His articles are regularly published in several media outlets and magazines. He gives regular political comments on radio and TV broadcasts. He also analyzed Kurdish politics and internal fratricide between political factions, and its dire consequences.
Dr. Moradian is Chair of Kurdish American Committee for Democracy and Human right in Iran, and co-founder of Voice of Kurdish-American Radio for Democracy, Peace, and Freedom.
Dr. Moradian is a former member of the board of directors of Kurdish National Congress of North America.
دکتۆر ئازاد مورادیان دهڵێت ئۆباما به لێهاتوویی خۆی وایکرد 60 ملیۆن ئهمریکایی دهنگی بۆ بدهن
ی مانگی یازده ٠٥, ٢٠٠٨
دکتۆر ئازاد مورادیان بهرپـرسی کوردهکانی دانیشـتووی ئهمریکا بۆ بهرگری له دیموکراسی له ئێران له گفتوگۆیهکدا لهگهڵ هاوکارمان جانی دیلان دهڵێت 47 سـاڵ لهمهوپـێش مارتن لوثهر کینک خهونی خۆی بۆ گۆڕانکاری له ئهمریکا ڕاگهیاند، ئێسـتا و له دوای 47 سـاڵ دهبینین منداڵێـکی ڕهش پـێست که لهو وهختهدا به دنیا هاتووه ئهمسـاڵ هات و نیشـانی دا که وڵاته یهکگرتووهکانی ئهمریکا جێی ئهوهیه که بتوانرێت خهونی ئهو مرۆڤانه تیایدا بێته دی که باوهڕیان به یهکسـانی ههیه بێ ئهوهی چاو له ڕهگهز و پـێسـت و بیروبڕوایان بکرێت و بتوانن له ئهمریکا دهسهڵات بگرنه دهست. پاشـان دهڵێت ئۆباما لهم قۆناغه مێژوویـیهدا توانی دهنگی خۆی بهرامبهر به دهنگی مهککهین زیادبکات و 60 ملیۆن کهس دهنگی بۆ بدهن.
دهتوانن گوێبیسـتی دهقی گفتوگۆكه بن له ڕێـگهی كلیـكـكردنی ئهو فایله دهنـگیـیهی سهرهوه، ماوهكهی 9:14 خولهكه.
On behalf of the Kurdish American Committee for Democracy in Iran, I congratulate the board of advisers, board of directors, members, and the supporters of the KNCNA on the 20th anniversary of excellent work for the promotion of the Kurdish issues in the North America. I hope that the 20th conference will be able to successfully reach its goals as it has always done.
Summary of Activities:
Since the last conference the committee, Establishing contact with different Kurdish opposition groups within Iran as well as in Diaspora.
– Communicated with the Eastern Kurdistan representatives in the US who have been involved in debates on the committees’ activities within the US.
– Formed contact with the representatives of the Non-Kurdish Iranian oppositional organizations in the US regarding a common goal against Iranian regime.
– One major goal of the committee from the beginning has been creating a unified Kurdish front, and later to establish a united oppositional front by bringing other minority groups together. We have taken major strides towards this goal.
– Unfortunately, the Iranian Kurdish organizations are on the merge of dissociating into separate groups, and no real unity is present at this moment, which seems to be the influence of the Iranian intelligence groups affecting the psychological and political problems within those organizations. We are considering that an intervention should takes place immediately before these organizations are spread apart even further and lose sight of unity.
As an organization from outside of the turmoil, we feel that we should intervene as pathologists to identify the issues that are fracturing these organizations.
– Talks at universities and other venues have been held on the issue of Kurdish political and human rights.
– Press releases as well as critical reviews of the events that somehow affect the Kurdish people in Iran have been published on a consistent basis and distributed among a vast network of concerned media.
– Acted as the lead expert consultants on Kurdish and Iranian issues for Radio news broadcasts and news websites.
– Directly and indirectly participated in various rallies and demonstrations to voice the Kurdish peoples’ cause and issues in Los Angeles and other major US cities.
– Began establishing contact inside Iran with the human rights activists and Kurdish human rights organizations.
– Researching and collecting an extensive archive of information regarding the work and activities that have taken place in Kurdistan of Iran within the past 3 decades.
Recommendation and request:
Due to the extensive archive we have collected, the connections we have made, the networking we have created to communicate with the media, as well as, because we are a specialized expert group, I request that KNCNA as well as all of our affiliates support this committee financially and professionally regarding issues of Iran.
One of the critical issues that the Kurds from Iran face within Iran as well as in diaspora is that we have been boycotted by the major media’s in the western hemisphere. However, this problem is not unique to the Kurdish minorities in Iran; it also affects the other ethnicity. It seems that the prominent mentalities of these medias are the establishment of a royal system or a republic in which there is no emphasis on the minority groups of Iran.
A statement that is important to keep in mind is that helping this committee and supporting it is a crucial aspect of a fight against injustice towards Kurds.
The new wave of violence that is taking place in Iran, which is targeting the Kurdish liberation activists is a threat not just to Kurds in Iran but also to Kurds in the rest of the world. One must realize that although this committee’s agenda is very specific and region orientated, its ultimate goal is broad and vast.
Iran as well as Turkey has both attacked the Kurds and now it is vital for the Kurds to form a unity and a Kurdish front to be able to retaliate against violent action. Any form of unity and support will be highly appreciated and can contribute greatly to the overall success of the Kurdish cause and to democracy as a whole.
Thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to give you a brief report on the activities of the Kurdish Committee for Democracy in Iran, and the Kurdish situation in Iranian Kurdistan.
Chair of Kurdish American Committee for Democracy and Human Rights in Iran/ KNCNA